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Abstract
Background In 2009, the Center for Medicare & Medic-
aid Services (CMS) began penalizing hospitals with high
rates of 30-day readmissions after hospitalizations for
certain conditions. This policy will expand to include TKA
in 2015.
Questions/purposes What are the median profits and
contribution margins of: (1) Medicare-reimbursed TKA,
(2) 30-day TKA readmission, and (3) entire episode of care
for readmitted TKA patients within 30 days compared to
nonreadmitted patients? (4) Under new CMS guidelines,
what financial penalty will the authors’ institution face if its
arthroplasty readmission rate exceeds the national average?
Methods A retrospective review of 3218 primary TKAs
performed during 2 years at a large urban academic
hospital network was conducted using administrative and
financial data.
Results The median profit and contribution margins,
respectively, were as follows: TKA episode, USD 5209 and
USD 11,726; 30-day readmission, USD 608 and USD
3814; TKA visit with readmission, USD 2855 and USD
13,901; TKA visit without readmission, USD 5300 and
USD 11,652. Readmission penalties could reach USD
6.21 million per year for the authors’ institution.
Discussion If our results are generalizable, unplanned
TKA readmissions lead to diminished total profit. Although
associated with a positive contribution margin, this is likely
to be a short-term phenomenon as the new CMS policy will
result in readmissions coming at a steep cost to referral
centers.
Level of Evidence Level IV, economic and decision
analyses. See Instructions for Authors for a complete
description of levels of evidence.
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Introduction
With growing national attention on cost containment,
unplanned readmissions have become a focus of healthcare
payers, policy makers, and providers. The Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) initially began
penalizing providers in 2008; the focus at that time was on
certain hospital-caused diseases, such as central line-
acquired infections [7, 10, 35]. Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2009, CMS has begun insti-
tuting reimbursement penalties for 30-day readmissions
after hospitalizations for heart failure, acute myocardial
infarction, and pneumonia [9, 33]. In August of 2013, the
CMS announced the expansion of this policy to include
patients admitted for elective THA and TKA for fiscal year
2015 [9]. Furthermore, because private insurers often
emulate Medicare’s payment methods, we can expect many
insurers to follow suit [4].
This new policy is not surprising, as Medicare is the
primary payer for approximately 75% of all TKAs [27],
and elective TKAs are among the most common surgeries
in the Medicare-age population [15, 26]. In time, with
increasing readmission rates [21] and decreasing reim-
bursements for arthroplasty [20, 25], TKA readmissions
will have increasingly significant financial implications,
even without an extension of CMS penalties to orthopae-
dics. Furthermore, other reimbursement changes are
appearing on the horizon, including Accountable Care
Organizations and ‘‘bundled payments’’, which will further
encourage cost containment and focus attention on
unplanned readmissions.
In anticipation of this change in policy, we sought to
answer the following questions: (1) What is the median
profit and contribution margin on a Medicare-reimbursed
TKA in a tertiary-care academic setting, (2) What is the
median profit and contribution margin of a readmission
TKA within 30 days, (3) What is the median profit and
contribution margin of an entire episode of care for TKA
patients who were readmitted within 30 days, how do those
values compare with patients who are not readmitted, and
(4) What would be the estimated penalty to the hospital if
those readmissions were not paid for under the new CMS
guidelines?
Patients and Methods
Study Design and Setting
This is a retrospective review of all 3218 patients who
underwent primary TKA between July 1, 2009, and June
30, 2011, using administrative and financial data. Patients
were admitted to our home institution, a large urban
tertiary care academic center with more than 1700 beds
distributed between three hospitals and with over 78,000
admissions annually.
Data Sources
Data for eligible TKA hospitalizations under review
between 2009 and 2011 were obtained from the health
system’s finance department. All readmissions to the
institution were captured, regardless of depart-
ment. Financial cost data for each hospitalization,
including readmissions, were obtained from the health
system’s cost accounting database, which is collected and
maintained using Horizon Performance Manager software
(McKesson Corp, San Francisco, CA, USA) [32]. This is a
standard costing system used by many entities in the
healthcare industry that functions to assign, as accurately as
possible, all hospital expenses to specific services provided,
ultimately deriving the cost of each patient encounter.
In this accounting system, for example, all hospital cost
centers down to the level of individual nursing stations,
CT scanning, or a building’s depreciation, are defined as
individual accounting units. Each unit is defined as either
patient care or overhead. The overhead units are allocated
to various patient care units based on statistics that gen-
erally match the items on the annual Medicare Cost Report
submitted annually by providers and as defined by CMS
[6]. For example, building depreciation costs are assigned
to patient care units based on square feet of facility utili-
zation and accounting costs are assigned based on the
patient charges generated through the care provided by
each unit.
The nonoverhead costs of patients are units based on a
running tab of the patient’s consumption during an
encounter. Various inputs are calculated differently. For
example, pharmaceutical costs are based on wholesale drug
prices, procedure costs are often based on the associated
Relative Value Units (RVUs) and historical data about the
associated resource and staff requirements to perform the
procedure, and the costs of implants are typically based on
the exact price paid to the supplier. Hospital charges are
only used in rare circumstances such as poorly studied
procedures where a running tab of required resources is not
available. In these circumstances, charges are adjusted
based on historical data to estimate the actual cost as
accurately as possible. Ultimately, all costs are assigned to
a specific patient encounter and are defined as either vari-
able or fixed, allowing useful analyses (the sum of variable
and fixed costs necessarily equals total costs).
Total revenue for each visit, including readmissions,
was calculated under the hypothetical assumption that the
study subjects comprised a Medicare-only population,
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demonstrating the overall effect of on arthroplasty reim-
bursement under the assumption that private insurers would
emulate Medicare’s reimbursement penalties. That is,
Medicare reimbursement was calculated for each patient as
a function of the Medicare Severity-Diagnosis Related
Group associated with the visit in accordance with CMS
policy, and actual reimbursement from non-Medicare
payers were ignored. This assumption constitutes a worst-
case scenario as Medicare typically reimburses at lower
levels than commercial payers but, more importantly, this
method improves generalizability as commercial reim-
bursement rates vary between institutions and geographic
areas.
Patients
For this study, we used a sample of convenience composed
of patients admitted to the institution under review.
Patients who had undergone TKA during the study period
were identified on the basis of the ICD-9 procedure code
for primary TKA (81.54). Readmissions were included
only if occurring for unforeseen causes; planned readmis-
sions for inpatient rehabilitation or skilled nursing care
were excluded from the analysis. Revision TKA proce-
dures were not included. Thus, only primary TKA
procedures and their related readmissions were included;
readmissions that included a revision procedure were not
included.
Identification of Outcomes
An episode of care was defined to encompass an initial
hospital visit when a primary TKA was performed and any
associated unplanned 30-day readmission(s). The eco-
nomic outcomes examined were the median costs,
Medicare reimbursements, profits, and contribution
margins generated by TKA, and, when applicable, by
subsequent unplanned 30-day readmission(s). Hospital
profit and contribution margin were determined for each
patient as reimbursement less total cost and reimbursement
less variable cost, respectively. Reimbursement was cal-
culated using Medical Severity-Diagnosis Related Group
weights in accordance with CMS policy. Calculations
assumed a Medicare-only population regardless of the
actual insurer to maximize generalizability, as private
reimbursement rates vary widely based on geography and
bargaining power in local markets. Total cost was calcu-
lated as the sum of direct and indirect costs, both of which
were determined through the robust cost accounting system
maintained by the health system’s finance department. The
maximum potential impact of reimbursement penalties,
which is set as 3% of all annual operating diagnosis-related
group reimbursement from the CMS to a hospital, was
determined by summing all such payments across the
departments and facilities of the hospital network under
review.
Statistical Analysis
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to analyze differences
between continuous nonparametric variables for all finan-
cial calculations. For all calculations, statistical
significance was defined by p values of less than 0.05.
Results are reported as median with associated interquartile
range and, when applicable, mean values.
Results
In the existing reimbursement system, a TKA episode
generated a median profit of USD 5209 (Fig. 1) and con-
tribution margin of USD 11,726 (Fig. 2). In calculating the
profit, we found the median cost to the hospital network
under review to be USD 16,361 (Fig. 3) and the reim-
bursement was USD 24,149 (Fig. 4). In calculating the
contribution margin, we found the median variable cost of
such an episode to be USD 10,190 (Fig. 5). Many outliers
with high Medicare Severity-Diagnosis Related Group
scores and high resultant reimbursements were present in
this nonparametric population.
The median unplanned 30-day readmission cost the
hospital USD 8027 and was reimbursed USD 7824, gen-
erating a profit of USD 608. The corresponding variable
cost was USD 4380. This generated a contribution margin
of USD 3814 (Table 1).
When considering entire episodes of care including both
the initial TKA visit and any subsequent readmissions, we
found that episodes with unplanned readmissions generated
a median profit of USD 2855 and contribution margin of
USD 13,901 while nonreadmitted patients generated a
profit of USD 5300 and contribution margin of USD
11,652. We found that readmitted patients were USD 4130
less profitable (p \ 0.001), generated USD 2997 greater
contribution margin, were USD 15,701 more expensive
(p \ 0.001), and were better reimbursed by USD 11,571
(p \ 0.001) compared to episodes without readmissions
(Table 2). Additionally, initial TKA visits that were asso-
ciated with subsequent unplanned readmissions were
USD 3223 less profitable (p \ 0.001) and generated USD
1,917 lower contribution margins (p = 0.008) than those
without associated readmissions. In calculating these
values, these initial TKA visits were USD 3250 more
expensive (p \ 0.001), reimbursed approximately equally
3136 Clement et al. Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research1
123
(p = 0.973), and generated higher variable costs
(p \ 0.001) (Table 3). We estimated that the readmission
penalties could reach USD 6.21 million per year for our
institution if the health system’s arthroplasty readmission
rate exceeds the national average.
Discussion
Given the large and growing volume of annual TKAs, this
procedure as well as its associated complications and
readmissions plays an important role in modern healthcare
spending. With reimbursement penalties from CMS on the
horizon, a better understanding of the financial implications
of unplanned readmissions after TKA will be instrumental
as hospitals determine what, if any, interventions should be
implemented to eliminate readmissions. The purpose of this
study was to elucidate the financial impact of unplanned
TKA readmissions on hospitals, both in the current reim-
bursement environment and under the planned CMS
readmission penalties. We found that the median TKA
episode generates a large positive contribution margin and
profit, making it desirable in both the short and long term to
continue providing this care. Readmissions within 30 days
were slightly profitable and generated a large contribution
margin, making them financially attractive in the short run
and slightly so in the long run. TKA patients with unplanned
readmissions were significantly less profitable than their
Fig. 1 This box plot depicts profits for different types of visits.
Fig. 2 This box plot depicts the contribution margins for different
types of visits.
Fig. 3 This box plot depicts the total costs for different types of
visits.
Fig. 4 This box plot depicts reimbursements for different types of
visits.
Fig. 5 This box plot depicts variable costs for different types of
visits.
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counterparts who were not readmitted, not due to the actual
readmission but because their initial hospitalizations were
more expensive but reimbursed at the same level. Finally,
readmission penalties could potentially reach millions of
dollars per year for the institution under review.
A limitation to this study is the potential inaccuracy of
our cost estimates. They were generated by the hospital’s
cost accounting system, which is relatively robust. Of note,
it minimizes reliance on hospital charges, which are a
notoriously inaccurate means of accounting for costs [17,
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31, 36]. However, any cost accounting system in a complex
institution relies on estimates and thus is not perfectly
accurate. Furthermore, since readmissions were only
slightly profitable in our findings, if cost data was inaccu-
rate, then readmissions could actually be unprofitable.
Another limitation to this study is the use of a single
institution’s data. While the hospital system under review
is large and offers most of the care for the local commu-
nity, in the event that a patient required postoperative
readmission and presented to an outside facility, this would
not be captured in our results. If future changes to CMS
policies discourage hospitals from admitting postoperative
complications from other facilities, our results could
change and a reanalysis would be merited. Lastly, it should
be noted that financial terms are variable across centers –
what we denote as ‘‘profit’’ and ‘‘contribution margin’’ in
this study may be identified as ‘‘operating income’’ or
‘‘operating margin’’, respectively, at other institutions.
Our findings demonstrate a positive contribution margin
and profit generated by the median primary TKA episode.
Contribution margin is typically considered a good repre-
sentation of an organization’s short-term incentives because
it is calculated based on variable costs, which can generally
be changed relatively quickly. By contrast, profit is a
reflection of both variable and fixed costs. The latter typically
includes overhead and administrative costs that cannot be
rapidly altered. Thus, profit is generally considered a good
representation of an organization’s longer-term incentives.
Since our results demonstrate a large positive contribution
margin and profit generated by the median primary TKA
episode, it suggests that the hospital network under review
has both a short- and long-term financial interest in contin-
uing to provide TKAs, which is not surprising.
The picture is more complex when considering un-
planned readmissions. Such hospitalizations tend to generate
a large contribution margin but are associated with a rela-
tively small profit. This incentive pattern suggests hospitals
have a financial motivation to permit unplanned post-TKA
readmissions in the short-term. Thus, our results do not
demonstrate that unplanned readmissions are currently
financially detrimental. In the longer-term, this incentive to
readmit patients with post-TKA is much weaker, and hos-
pitals with limited capacity could be motivated to transition
the resources currently spent on unplanned TKA readmis-
sions to more profitable service lines.
Our financial analysis also reveals that patients who
underwent TKA and were readmitted to the hospital network
under review tended to generate significantly less profit and
contribution margin than their counterparts who were not
readmitted. However, the lost gains occurred during the initial
TKA hospitalization; they typically were not a result of the
readmission. This is not entirely surprising as previous liter-
ature has suggested that readmitted patients are sicker and, on
average, spend more time in the hospital during their
arthroplasty hospitalization [11, 37]. If our results are gener-
alizable, readmitted patients after TKA are financially
attractive, but less so than their nonreadmitted counterparts.
Recent literature by Eappen et al. [16] has demonstrated a
detrimental effect of numerous surgical complications on
hospital finances. A subtle but important difference in our
findings is that readmission visits themselves were profitable
(slightly) and generated a substantial contribution margin;
readmitted patients were less profitable due to the high costs of
their initial TKA hospitalization, which adds a new consid-
eration for arthroplasty surgeons. While it is likely impractical
and arguably unethical to eliminate care for such patients, it
may well benefit hospitals to identify this population and
institute interventions that shorten lengths of stay and ensure
preoperative optimization of all comorbid conditions.
The entire annual CMS operating diagnosis-related group
reimbursement to the institution under review was USD
207.3 million, which translates into USD 6.21 million at
risk for penalization if the health system’s arthroplasty
readmission rate exceeds the national average. This data was
provided by the health system’s finance department, and
reflects the maximum possible penalty (3%), which would
represent a major impact on the arthroplasty program under
review [8]. In fact, a full penalty of 3% of all annual CMS
operating diagnosis-related group payments would likely
constitute a substantial financial blow to even the largest
arthroplasty program. This threat may be strong enough to
motivate hospitals’ to invest in efforts that reduce unplanned
readmissions after TKA and the other disease conditions
eligible for CMS reimbursement penalties. This penalty may
affect this institution as the readmission rate found here
approximates the national average reported in recent litera-
ture [12]. However, while only hospitals with the highest
readmission rates will be vulnerable to the full 3% penalty,
if hospitals respond by implementing successful readmission
prevention programs as CMS intends, the national average
readmission rate can be expected to fall, incentivizing more,
or possibly even most, hospitals to strive to eliminate un-
planned post-TKA readmissions.
In conclusion, we found that TKA patients with un-
planned readmissions generate significantly less total profit
but higher contribution margins than their counterparts
who are not readmitted. The lost profit occurs because the
initial hospitalization is more expensive for patients who
are later readmitted; it is not a result of the readmission.
The actual readmission itself generates a substantial con-
tribution margin and a small profit. As mentioned earlier,
contribution margin is considered a better gauge of hospital
behavior in the short-term while profit is a better reflection
of long-term incentives. Thus, in the current reimburse-
ment environment, hospitals have an incentive to continue
tolerating unplanned readmissions in the short-term and
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will only be motivated to eliminate readmissions in the
long-term if they are operating at capacity and believe
TKA readmissions can be replaced by more profitable care.
However, CMS readmission penalties could potentially
reach millions of dollars per year for a large institution
similar to the one examined in this study. This will likely
be sufficient to create both short- and long-term incentiv-
izes for hospitals with above-average readmission rates to
invest in efforts to eliminate post-TKA readmissions.
Further research is still needed to establish pathways of
care to reduce costs and readmissions; considering con-
solidation of care at a single hospital network [5, 18, 19,
22, 26, 28–30], tailored discharge disposition [3, 34],
accelerated care pathways [2, 24], and nonmedical inter-
ventions such as interdisciplinary home care programs [1,
13, 14, 23] may lead to a change in current practice.
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